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Abstract: This paper outlines and demonstrates the viability of  a consistent dialogic approach to the 
semantics of  utterances in natural language. Based on the philosophical picture of  language as dialogue, 
adumbrated by Mikhail Bakhtin and incorporating work in conversation analysis and cognitive-functional 
linguistics, I develop a method for analyzing both the function and the content of  human utterances within a 
unified philosophical framework. I demonstrate the viability of  this method of  analysis by applying it to a 
brief  conversational exchange (in Hebrew), which is analyzed here in full detail. 
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Introduction 
My aim in this paper is to demonstrate the viability of  a dialogic paradigm in approaching the 
semantics of  utterances in natural languages. By “semantics” I mean the methodology of  
analyzing the meaning of  linguistic utterances in a way that is sensitive to their content.1 
Traditionally, the meaning of  utterances has been analyzed in terms of  the denotation of  the 
words and the logical structure of  the sentences that appear in them. This view of  meaning in 
language reflects a broader conception of  the nature of  language that essentially goes back to 
classical antiquity (Harris 1981), but has hardly lost its relevance today. This paradigm established 
reference and truth as the two central concepts in the philosophy of  language and defined the 
main grammatical units that language is broken down into – the word as the chief  unit of  
                                                 
1 The term “dialogic semantics” or “dialogical semantics” is also used in a different sense in the field of  
dialogical logic. More relevant is the notion of  dialogical semantics in Linell (2009). While my approach shares much 
with that of  Linell (and is indebted to some of  his earlier works), my notion of  semantics is significantly different. 
In particular, unlike Linell, who focuses his discussion on lexical semantics, my approach bypasses the lexical level 
altogether. 
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reference in language and the sentence as the principal linguistic unit in which a proposition can 
be expressed and so can be assigned a truth-value. Indeed, in this paradigm, the entire linguistic 
apparatus for analyzing utterances, the purpose of  the analysis, and the way meaning is 
conceptualized all derive from the two relations of  reference and predication. 
In recent decades, this traditional approach to meaning has come under attack from many 
quarters. The nature of  language as embodying human action and interaction and the inherent 
contextuality and situatedness of  all human utterances are now acknowledged by many linguists 
and philosophers of  language. One may say, risking overgeneralization, that such fields as 
pragmatics, discourse analysis, and conversation analysis are moving in a direction that is 
consistently distancing them from the traditional picture. 
And yet, this picture is often paradoxically reaffirmed as it is being rejected. Such pillars of  
pragmatics as speech act theory (Searle 1969) and Gricean implicature (Grice 1989, 3–143) 
incorporate an understanding of  language as action and as cooperation between agents, which is 
in many ways alien to the traditional conception of  language. But on the technical level, these 
same theories served to entrench a strictly propositional understanding of  the semantics of  
language, through Searle’s distinction between the sense and the illocutionary force of  a sentence 
and Grice’s notion of  “what is said”.2 
                                                 
2 Both Searle and Grice propose their respective methods of  analyzing the meaning of  utterances as pragmatic 
add-ons mounted on top of  a standard referential-logical analysis of  sentence semantics. This standard analysis 
yields the “sense” of  the sentence or “what is said” in it. To the “sense” one should add an illocutionary force, and 
from “what is said” one is to make implicatures. So, while Grice and Searle probably wanted to stress that a formal 
semantic analysis is not enough to understand utterances, many of  their followers used these distinctions to propose 
a more strictly formalist conception of  semantics. A typical example is Bach (2005). Bach is well aware that the 
literal meaning of  many figurative expressions has no real place in either the production or the comprehension of  
utterances using them. Thus, when one says, “Education is the key to success”, no actual key would usually come to 
mind, not even for a moment. Nevertheless, Bach takes the possibility that the non-literal meaning of  this sentence 
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Why is that so? I would suggest that the reason is that such approaches do not rely on a fully 
worked-out alternative picture of  language. Language is viewed as action, interaction, 
cooperation, on the functional level, but the old picture still dictates how the content of  utterances 
is conceptualized. 
The traditional way of  treating the content of  utterances too has been challenged, by 
cognitive and functional linguists (see especially Croft 2001; Gasparov 2010; Hopper 1998). 
However, these approaches have not yet been clearly integrated with analysis on the level of  
discourse pragmatics. The importance of  bridging this divide has been recognized by several 
scholars in recent years (Croft 2009; Fried and Östman 2005; Salmon 2010) and the present 
paper seeks to contribute to this effort. 
It will thus not be my concern in this paper to directly criticize the traditional picture of  
language. Rather, my aim is to show that an alternative approach, based on a coherent alternative 
understanding of  language, can yield satisfactory results not only in the analysis of  utterances on 
the functional level, but also in analyzing their content. 
In what follows I use the picture of  language as dialogue that was first adumbrated by Mikhail 
Bakhtin and other members of  the Bakhtin Circle as a philosophical basis for developing a 
method of  analyzing utterances on both these levels. Doing this will allow me also to integrate 
work in conversation analysis on the one hand and in cognitive-functional linguistics on the 
other, into a coherent picture of  language. The dialogic approach is founded on one basic 
relation, the relation of  responding, which entails the entire linguistic apparatus for the analysis of  
utterances, as well as the way linguistic meaning is conceptualized. 
In the first and second parts of  the article I shall explain briefly some aspects of  the way in 
which language and meaning are conceptualized in the dialogic approach. In doing that I aim to 
construct a method of  dialogic semantic analysis for utterances in natural language. In the third 
                                                                                                                                                        
should count as “what is said” or as its semantic content to be so obviously unacceptable that he constructs reductio 
ad absurdum arguments based on its rejection. 
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part of  the article I shall demonstrate the practical usability of  the proposed method by applying 
it to comprehensively analyze a brief  conversation. While the presentation in the first and second 
parts will necessarily be dogmatic, the sample semantic analysis in the third part will both clarify 
and support my main theoretical claims. 
Dialogic relations and dialogic units 
The utterance 
The dialogic conception of  language considers language to be a form of  dialogue, or interaction, 
between people. It contends that human utterances are essentially dialogic. Even when an 
utterance does not apparently participate in an interaction, it always responds to past utterances in 
a variety of  ways and always anticipates (plans, fears, hopes for) a response of  some sort. What 
people say and mean is wholly accounted for by the dialogues they take part in.3 
This conception of  language is similar to the one supported by some ordinary language 
philosophers and with the use theory of  meaning that most of  them adhere to, but it offers a 
more radical interpretation of  linguistic phenomena. It is radical in the sense that it does not take 
anything the traditional paradigm offers for granted. It works out its own units in which language 
is to be analyzed and its own understanding of  what linguistic meaning is. I will begin with the 
units. 
For Bakhtin (1986a), the basic unit of  language is what he calls an utterance.4 In terms of  its 
extension, the utterance is a unit of  discourse delimited by the change of  speaking subject 
(Bakhtin 1986a, 71ff), that is, it is an entire contribution to a conversation or to a dialogue in a 
                                                 
3 The main ideas of  the dialogic conception of  language can be found in Bakhtin (1981, 259–331), Bakhtin 
(1984, 181–204), Bakhtin (1986a), Voloshinov (1973), and Voloshinov (1983). For exposition and development in 
more recent works, see e.g. Lähteenmäki (2001), Linell (1998), Linell (2009), and Wold (1992). 
4 The term “utterance” is also current in formal semantic literature, but while an utterance in this sense is 
(roughly) the act of  uttering a sentence token, an utterance in Bakhtin’s sense is a unit of  interaction, independent of  
any syntactic unit. 
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broader sense (e.g. an entire speech, article, or novel). In terms of  how it is constructed, an 
utterance is a (projected) whole, from beginning to end, in which the speaker said what she 
planned to say, for now (Bakhtin 1986a, 76ff). 
If  the interaction being examined is a conversation, the utterance would be the same as a turn 
of  talk. Indeed the features of  the utterance as described here dovetail with the way a turn of  talk 
is understood in Conversation Analysis (Sacks, Schegloff  and Jefferson 1974; and cf. Ford 2004): 
a turn’s limits are eventually marked by speaker change, but are determined from within by the 
projected possibility of  such change, by its projected end. If  a speaker is interrupted before she 
has finished, such an interruption is itself  a kind of  action that makes the projected whole of  the 
turn relevant in the conversation, even as it is cut short. 
Above all, an utterance is defined as the unit of  discourse that responds and can be 
responded to (Bakhtin 1986a, 76ff).5 As such, the utterance is more than just the stretch of  text 
covered by its extension. It is essentially a form of  human action, and therefore does not respect 
the distinction between text and context. The particular circumstances in which a particular 
utterance is made are really part and parcel of  the utterance itself. No utterance can be 
adequately described by its “text” alone. Any adequate description of  an utterance must include 
some of  its relevant “context”. From this it also follows that any utterance is in principle unique, 
as no two utterances can be made in exactly the same circumstances (though, as I will show, this 
does not make utterances impossible to analyze). 
                                                 
5 A seeming counterexample to this definition is that it is possible to respond to one part of  an utterance. Thus, 
I may criticize a particular claim that appears in a paper I read, rather than the paper as a whole (Brandist 2001). 
Note, however, that it only makes sense for me to criticize that claim if  the author of  the paper actually makes it as 
part of  her argument in that paper. If, on the other hand, the claim appears in her paper as a reconstruction of  
somebody else’s position, I may still criticize it as an incorrect or misleading reconstruction, but not as a claim that the 
author actually makes. Thus, when my response focuses on one particular detail in an utterance, it nevertheless 
perceives this detail not as a disconnected linguistic expression, but rather as a part of  an utterance which plays a 
particular role within the utterance as a whole. The entire utterance, in the final analysis, is still the unit responded to. 
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The unit of  the utterance belongs to the very heart of  the dialogic conception of  language, as 
it is defined by the dialogic relation of  responding. But beyond this immediate level, dialogic relations 
also extend inside the utterance, that is, to the level of  linguistic content. First, utterances often 
(and in a broader sense – always) reenact a sort of  dialogue between different voices or characters 
that appear in them, as, for example, when a speaker reports the words of  another person and 
then comments on them. Secondly, people do not just invent the language they speak, but 
neither do they take it from some neutral repository of  linguistic conventions. Rather, people 
take the linguistic means they use from other people’s past utterances, and these linguistic means 
carry their previous users’ actions and their typical contexts of  utterance with them. By 
appropriating them for the purposes of  her own utterance, the speaker enters a micro-dialogue 
with those who used these bits of  language in the past. 
I shall now proceed to examine these two levels of  inner dialogicity and the units of  analysis 
that can be used on each. 
Reenacting dialogic relations 
A play or a novel is an utterance by its author, which participates in a cultural dialogue and is 
responded to by its readers and reviewers. Within it we find characters conducting interactions 
and dialogues among them. This is one example of  reenacting dialogic relations. Reported speech is 
another example – the voice of  the person being quoted enters the utterance and interacts with 
the voice of  the speaker herself. 
A very important form of  reenacted dialogic relations is what Bakhtin termed double-voiced 
discourse (Bakhtin 1984, 185–99), where two voices can be heard simultaneously in the very same 
words. A typical case would be parody. Here we have the voice of  the target (the particular 
person or stereotypical social image being parodied) reproduced in the utterance, and in that very 
act also ridiculed by the speaker. 
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Following Bakhtin, I will use the term voice to refer to the “participants” in a reenacted 
dialogue. Voices are not units in the traditional sense, as they do not necessarily have a clear 
extension. Voices may overlay one another, may be present throughout an utterance, and may 
indeed be made relevant without being explicitly voiced (Bakhtin 1984, 207ff; Cooren 2010, 136–
137). They are better thought of  as functions of  the utterance than as its parts. 
One may distinguish between three general types of  voices: personae, figures, and positions. 
A persona is somebody whose voice is acted out in the utterance. It may be identified with a 
specific person (e.g. somebody quoted in the utterance), an imaginary character, or a social 
stereotype. Figures (following Cooren 2010) are a broader category of  entities that may be said to 
have a voice within the utterance. It includes such things as principles that one speaks in the 
name of, organizations one represents, social roles one embodies, facts “speaking for 
themselves” in the utterance, etc.6 Personae are heard in the utterance in a more direct sense than 
figures are, but the distinction between them is not meant to be sharp. 
Finally, positions are voices that connect the reenacted dialogue in the utterance with the actual 
one. There are three positions in each utterance: (implied) author, character, and (implied) 
audience (Voloshinov 1983, 22). I use these terms here much in the same way as they are used in 
literary theory. In particular, the implied author and the implied audience are not to be identified 
with the actual author (or speaker) and audience, who conduct their dialogue on the immediate, 
rather than the reenacting, level. Rather, these are positions that can be reconstructed from the 
utterance itself  as what it is implied that the author wants to say and what it is implied that the 
addressee should think of  it. 
                                                 
6 Cooren’s notion of  non-human agency is, of  course, quite controversial, and often misunderstood. But note 
that on the level of  reenacted dialogue, non-human agency is in any case not a problematic notion. Nobody expects 
characters in literary works, for example, to necessarily be actual human beings (and cf. Bakhtin 1986b, 138–39 on 
personification and reification). 
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Every persona or figure may be assigned to one of  these three positions, that is, it may be a 
character in the “plot” of  the utterance, or be a mouthpiece for the (implied) author,7 or reflect 
the implied stance of  the audience. But even if  no other voice is assigned to them, positions may 
be said to be voices in their own right. An utterance in which the speaker mimics somebody may 
not have a single sound in it that belongs to the author’s voice, but we would still hear the 
author’s voice in the way the other person is mimicked, and even in the very fact she is 
mimicked. Not a word in the utterance may be said in the name of  its audience, but the entire 
utterance is shaped by the way it is meant to be understood by it. 
Appropriating dialogic relations 
On the level of  appropriating dialogic relations, the speaker enters a micro-dialogue with 
previous speakers over the use of  the various elements that appear in her utterance. I will be 
using the general term element to refer to whatever carries over the “taste” (Bakhtin 1981, 293) of  
past utterances into the speaker’s utterance. 
More specifically, elements are associated with past utterances in at least one of  four ways: 
they may distinctly belong to a voice, may bring to mind a situation (singular or typical), may be 
associated with an action (speech acts included), and may belong to a distinct genre. For instance, a 
deliberately mimicked Southern accent is an element that is associated with the persona of  a 
Southerner. A greeting formula, even if  not used as an actual greeting, is an element that is 
associated with the kind of  situation in which a greeting is called for. The phrase, “You don’t 
say!”, even when uttered ironically, is associated with the action of  expressing surprise. The 
                                                 
7 When in the analysis below I say that some parts of  an utterance are spoken in the author’s voice this should be 
taken to mean that a persona identified with the speaker acts as the speaker’s mouthpiece in this sense. Strictly 
speaking, this persona is identical neither with the implied author position nor with the actual speaker. 
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phrase “To whom it may concern”, even if  it is not actually part of  a formal letter, is associated 
with the genre of  formal letter.8 
One need not assume full agreement on what is brought into an utterance by each element, or 
even on exactly how to break an utterance down into elements. What an element is associated 
with differs with the particular life experience of  every individual, but since this experience 
comes from interaction with others, there is enough common ground between different people 
to proceed without major failures in communication. 
In terms of  extension, elements are a motley crew. In principle, almost anything can serve as 
an element: gestures, facial expressions, intonation contours, or, to move to the other end of  the 
spectrum, generic construction patterns and plot development techniques. But my focus here 
will be on the more textural kind of  element, that following Gasparov (2010) I will be calling the 
communicative fragment (or CF). 
Bakhtin (1981) originally spoke of  people’s words being appropriated from past utterances, but 
it is easy to see that the single word cannot be the unit this level of  dialogic relations defines. 
While some words bear the marks of  a typical action, situation etc. to which they belong, others 
do not. If  you hear the word “carburetor”, a car mechanic comes to mind. If, on the other hand, 
you hear the word “ground”, many things may come to mind, but nothing as specific. But what 
about “on solid ground”, “groundless accusations”, “on the grounds that…”? 
I am not claiming to break new ground here, of  course. The importance of  collocations and 
formulaic expressions in language has been emphasized by many functional and cognitive 
linguists. The point that these units are dialogically appropriated from past utterances is not new 
either. The explicit link with Bakhtin (1981) has been made already by Hopper (1998, 169). 
                                                 
8 Space does not allow me to discuss the issue of  speech genres, and genres in general, here. While I will be able 
to bypass this notion when analyzing the conversational sequence below, any dialogic theory of  language would be 
incomplete without dealing with the use of  genres in dialogue. For an interesting recent treatment of  the subject, see 
Salmon (2010). 
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Gasparov (2010, 13) makes a similar point, but his treatment of  the issue (see esp. Gasparov 
2010, 34–81 and 149–184) offers important conceptual developments over previous works. 
While in many senses it is akin to construction grammar (Croft 2001; Goldberg 200X), 
Gasparov’s approach takes the way cognitive linguistics reconceptualizes grammar further to its 
logical conclusion. Instead of  an abstract hierarchy of  grammatical constructions, Gasparov 
focuses his analysis of  utterances on concrete, tangible expressions. Instead of  explaining the 
immense diversity of  the linguistic content of  human utterances as the result of  mechanically 
combining units that have a fixed form, Gasparov explains it by suggesting a flexible unit – the 
CF – that can be combined with others in many different ways. 
Essentially, a CF is a bit of  language, usually an expression the length of  a short phrase 
(possibly with a lacuna), that speakers of  a language are familiar with as-is, and which carries for 
people associative links with voices, situations, actions and also with other CFs that often 
precede it or follow it. While many CFs are relatively complete (proverbs, speech formulae, 
typical interjections), far more are fragmentary, that is, not usually meant to stand on their own 
(e.g. “the thing is that…”, “I mean…”, “you know…”). 
Moreover, CFs, like any product of  oral culture (cf. Lord 2000), are variant (or in Gasparov’s 
terms, volatile): most of  them have several versions, and therefore may not have a definitive 
form. To use Gasparov’s own example (Gasparov 2010, 58ff), the phrase “In a major shift of  
policy” may be viewed as a CF in its own right, but may also be analyzed as consisting, for 
example, of  “in a major…” and “a major shift of  policy”, or of  “in a major…” and “shift of  
policy”, or of  “in a major…”, “a major shift”, and “shift of  policy”. All the options mentioned 
are acceptable, because all the proposed CFs are bits of  language most English newspaper 
readers would be familiar with as-is. We remember them all in this nebulous state, as different 
variations on similar themes, rather than as distinct rigid forms. 
CFs can also be modified in various ways (e.g. curtailed or extended by analogy; see Gasparov 
2010, 113–148), and we learn to identify them in all their modifications. CFs are meant to be 
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modified, combined, stringed together, and grafted onto one another to produce full utterances. 
We will also see below that a CF may be present in an utterance with only some of  its parts 
voiced, if  the setting makes some aspects of  the “taste” it caries relevant. Thus, eventually, any 
actually occurring verbal utterance can be analyzed into CFs. 
I have presented the main structure of  units and relations through which the dialogic 
conception of  language examines utterances in interaction and their content. Let me now explain 
how this structure can be used to analyze what utterances mean. 
Dialogic semantic analysis 
A dialogic analysis of  meaning 
Just as it has its own native way of  defining linguistic units, the dialogic conception of  language 
also has its native way of  looking at meaning in language. It is again based on the notion of  
response and on the fact that a response always, in one way or another, reflects a certain 
understanding of  what it responds to. Thus, meaning is given in response (Bakhtin 1986b, 145). 
This implies a notion of  meaning that is quite different from the traditional one (but still 
reflects at least some of  the aspects of  the pre-theoretical everyday notion of  meaning that 
people have). Rather than some sort of  self-identical thing that gets transferred from one head 
to another in communication, meaning in the dialogic view is understood as a dynamic 
projection of  the process of  interaction. The meaning of  each utterance is construed in at least a 
slightly different way every time it receives a response. In fact, the meaning of  utterances is 
negotiated by the interlocutors in the course of  the dialogue between them (Linell 1998, 78). 
According to this view, when people agree on what an utterance means, this agreement is not the 
trivial reflection of  the identity of  a thing (the meaning) to itself, but rather it is an achievement 
of  the interlocutors.9 
                                                 
9 Such a perspectivist view of  meaning needs not imply an “everything goes” kind of  relativism. It goes beyond 
the scope of  this paper to argue for this point in any detail, but the main reason is that it takes an actual response to 
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A different way to formulate the idea that meaning is given in response is to say that every 
utterance has a meaning potential (Lähteenmäki 2004; Linell 2009; Rommetveit 1974), which is 
actualized in different ways by every utterance that responds to it (Bakhtin 1986b, 145–46, and 
cf. Bilmes 1985 for a similar approach in Conversation Analysis). The meaning potential of  the 
utterance itself  is strictly speaking ineffable, as any attempt to formulate it would itself  be a 
response to the utterance, which actualizes this potential in one particular way. Nevertheless, for 
a dialogic semantic analysis to be possible there has to be a way to account for where this 
meaning potential comes from and how it is worked out. This can be done by extending the 
same principle (meaning potential actualized by response) to the two levels of  dialogic relations 
within the utterance, which I discussed above. 
Elements carry over their uses and associations from past utterances and their appropriation 
responds to these past uses. The meaning potential of  an element thus consists of  all the things 
it can be associated with: people who have used it, places and situations in which it has been 
used, actions performed by it, other elements that it is associated with because they often come 
together, etc.10 While some of  these associations are more central than others, no association, no 
matter how remote or idiosyncratic, can be ruled out a priori. Any association may be made 
relevant when the element is actualized. 
                                                                                                                                                        
construe an utterance as meaning this or that. While there is no way to encompass all the possible construals an 
utterance may receive, an actual response can never construe it in an arbitrary way. A response will always reflect one 
of  the ways in which it makes sense to understand (or misunderstand; actual misunderstandings are more than just 
arbitrary errors in understanding) the utterance. 
10 Note that CFs and other elements are not representations. They acquire their meaning potentials because they 
are typical of, or at least reminiscent of, what certain people do in certain situations, for certain purposes, etc. In most 
cases they emulate some kind of  action or utterance, but do not represent any entity. 
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When a speaker appropriates an element in her utterance, responds to its previous uses by 
making it serve her purposes, she actualizes its meaning potential in a particular way.11 This is 
achieved, on the technical level, by constraining the possible understanding of  the element. 
First, elements are chosen “for the occasion”, that is, to fit the setting in which the utterance is 
made, and only that in their associative baggage, which can fit the setting, would be heard in 
them when they are used. A special effort, essentially modifying the context using other 
elements, should be made to make anything else about them relevant. 
Another constraining factor is the other elements used in the utterance to create the same 
voice. The juxtaposition of  elements blocks the parts of  their meaning potentials that are 
incompatible with one another (Gasparov 2010; Linell 2009; Rommetveit 1974). Thus, if  a 
speaker says, “What a lovely day! I’m soaking wet!” she is using two CFs with conflicting 
meaning potentials. “What a lovely day!” is something one typically says to express joy, especially 
at the weather, and in the most typical case this also implies that the weather is sunny. On the 
other hand, “I’m soaking wet!” is typically an expression of  dissatisfaction with a situation in 
which the speaker’s clothes and body are wet, most typically because of  being caught in the rain. 
These two conflicting meaning potentials can be reconciled, though. For example, if  the 
utterance was made when it started raining after a prolonged drought or a long heat wave, “What 
a lovely day!” retains its meaning as an expression of  joy at the weather, while the implication 
that the weather is sunny gets blocked, and “I’m soaking wet!” retains its connection with being 
wet and with the rain, but can no longer be interpreted as an expression of  dissatisfaction.12 
                                                 
11 This also means that the new use in the present utterance adds a unique angle to the element itself, to what it 
will mean from now on to others (Hopper 1998). Normally such innovation remains limited to a very slight 
variation on the already-established theme, but wild creative leaps also happen (a matter I shall not discuss here). 
12 Of  course, such reconciliation of  meaning potentials can also override the “literal meaning” of  the words 
used. Thus, in Rommetveit’s (1974) original example, the sentence “My spinster aunt is an infant”, which seemingly 
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Finally, the meaning of  the element as it is used in the utterance is set out in the way it 
contributes to the orchestration of  voices on the level of  reenacted dialogic relations. Note that 
while this level is not integrated into the models developed by Rommetveit (1974) and Gasparov 
(2010), it is by no means redundant. The juxtaposition of  two elements blocks conflicting parts 
of  their meaning potentials if  they both belong to the same voice, but not if  they are distributed 
between two different voices, in which case the conflicting potentials may, on the contrary, be 
used to mark the differences between the voices. To use the same example again, “What a lovely 
day!” can also be easily heard as ironic (Bakhtin 1984 lists irony as a form of  double-voiced 
discourse, and the analysis in Sperber and Wilson 1981, while not using Bakhtin’s terms, makes 
exactly the same point). In this case, the typical connection of  “What a lovely day!” with sunny 
weather and its role as an expression of  joy remain in place, as do the connection of  “I’m 
soaking wet!” with rain and its role as an expression of  dissatisfaction. But now the two elements 
belong to different voices, with the author position aligning itself  with the dissatisfaction of  the 
latter and against the joy of  the former. 
A voice may be heard in an utterance because it is made relevant by the setting (e.g. when the 
interlocutors embody certain social roles, these roles may enter the utterance as figures or as 
personae). It may also be heard because of  a speech genre (Bakhtin 1986) that an utterance 
corresponds with (e.g. in a prayer, the audience voice is that of  a deity, even if  this is never 
explicitly stated). Finally, elements identified with a particular voice (such as the southern accent I 
used as an example before) can also bring this voice into the utterance. 
Since voices belong to actors (particular people, social stereotypes and roles, personified 
things and ideas, etc.), actions that are identified with these actors are brought by them as part of  
their meaning potential into the utterance. The setting and the elements used to create these 
voices in the utterance all allow to specify a particular action or sequence of  actions that can be 
                                                                                                                                                        
contains a contradiction (between “spinster” and “infant”) can be interpreted to mean, e.g., that the spinster aunt is 
innocent in some matters.  
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attributed to each voice (although, again, there may always be room for misunderstanding in 
identifying both the voice itself  and its action). 
The action performed by each voice takes part in a reenacted dialogue or interaction within 
the utterance, which may be quite elaborate. Eventually all the potentials that these actions and 
interactions bring into the utterance are actualized by the response they receive from the author’s 
position. A voice can be identified with the author’s position itself, or it can be overlaid by it. In 
the latter case the author’s position may be more sympathetic to the voice or more hostile to it 
(Bakhtin 1984, 194ff  used the terms “unidirectional double-voiced discourse” and “vari-
directional double-voiced discourse” respectively).13 
The resulting, usually quite complex, attitude of  the author position should be again viewed 
as having a meaning potential, which is actualized by the audience position. That is, a good way to 
formulate what an utterance is designed to mean is to describe the sort of  response that its implied 
audience is supposed to make to it. Note that this is in line with the analysis of  meaning 
originally proposed by Grice (1989): what the utterer means is to produce a certain response in 
the audience on the grounds of  the audience’s recognition of  the intention to produce this 
response. Of  course, the audience here is not the actual audience of  the utterance – there may 
not be any (Grice 1989, 112) – but the implied audience, or audience position. 
Finally, this designated meaning of  the utterance serves as the utterance’s meaning potential. 
This potential is actualized by the responses the utterance receives from its actual audience and 
in subsequent turns. On this level, to answer the question, “What does this utterance mean?” is 
                                                 
13 This account is greatly simplified to avoid making the exposition too long and cumbersome. Thus, in the 
analysis of  the conversational exchange below we will see utterances in which there is a double-deck construction, 
with one persona overlaying the voice of  another, and in turn being overlaid by the author position. A reenacted 
dialogue can also be employed in a more iconic manner, when the author position’s attitude applies to the entire 
reenacted scene, rather than to each voice individually. Finally, the author position’s attitude towards a voice is 
usually more complex than simply “sympathetic” or “hostile”. As in any other kind of  response, one can do more 
than just agree or disagree. 
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equivalent to answering the question, “What is the role this utterance plays in the dialogue in 
which it takes part?” From a dialogic perspective, the meaning (or rather meanings) of  an 
utterance is ultimately given on this functional level, but the analysis that leads to it has to include 
a detailed consideration of  the utterance’s content.14 
The analytic procedure 
This discussion, while only a bear sketch, has allowed me to identify the procedure I shall be 
following in analyzing the brief  conversation below. For every utterance (turn) of  the exchange 
the analysis will consist of  the following stages: 
(1) Describing the setting in which the utterance is made. I use the term “setting” here in a 
broad sense. A setting includes the previous utterances to which the given utterance is 
immediately responding. On top of  that, a description of  the setting includes any relevant 
information about the physical environment and about social practices that define the 
situation in which the utterance acts.15 
(2) Listing and describing the elements that are used in the utterance. I shall particularly focus 
on the communicative fragments (CFs) used16 and on the actions, voices and situations 
with which they are associated. 
                                                 
14 As I noted along the way, in a dialogic approach there is no single uniquely correct way to reconstruct the 
meaning potential of  an utterance. Different responses may reflect differing analyses of  the utterance on all levels 
of  dialogic relations. A significant difference may result in a misunderstanding. One of  the advantages of  the sort of  
dialogic semantic analysis presented here, on which space does not allow me to focus, is that it provides a realistic 
account of  misunderstandings in conversation. 
15 Strictly speaking, these social practices, and even the physical environment, shape the utterance not directly, 
but rather through the established ways of  acting and speaking that are linked with them, that is through responding 
to past utterances. Thus, the setting in which an utterance acts can be defined as the totality of  all past utterances to 
which it responds on the level of  immediate dialogic relations. 
16 To save space, I will be relying mostly on my native knowledge of  the language and personal familiarity with 
the speakers to identify the CFs used in the analyzed conversation. While the ultimate test for a phrase being a CF is 
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(3) Identifying the voices heard in the utterance and following the reenacted dialogue that takes 
place between them. This will also allow me to trace the actualization of  the meaning 
potential brought in by the elements. 
(4) Reconstructing the designated meaning of  the utterance. 
(5) Showing how the utterance thus responds to previous utterances and acts in the setting. 
(6) Following up the meanings that the utterance assumes in latter utterances that respond to 
it. 
My analysis below will proceed from the first utterance to the last, which allows me to take 
two shortcuts: first, I shall describe the setting (stage 1) in detail for the first utterance only. For 
each subsequent utterance, the setting is given in this initial description plus the analysis of  all 
previous utterances. Secondly, only the analysis of  the last utterance will include stage 6 
(reflection of  meaning in response). For the other utterances, this will be incorporated into stage 
5 of  the analysis of  subsequent utterances. 
The proof  of  the pudding: a dialogic semantic analysis of  a conversation 
The practical test of  the construction presented so far will be an analysis of  the brief  
conversation transcribed below.17 I will conduct a detailed analysis of  all the utterances. It is 
precisely my point that such an analysis can be accomplished without skipping any part or 
element of  any utterance (though some nuances will be left out for lack of  space). 
                                                                                                                                                        
that it is known to speakers as-is, there are also objective ways to validate the CF status of  a phrase (Gasparov 2010, 
58–76). Often a simple Internet search on a phrase will yield sufficient information on whether it can be considered 
a CF (based on the number of  search results) and on its typical uses. 
17 I used the transcription conventions described in Jefferson (2004). The italicized text is the transliterated 
Hebrew original. An English gloss appears below every line in the transcript. A more “literal” translation is not 
added to the transcript, but will be noted in the analysis itself. 
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This conversation was selected from a small collection of  about eight hours of  recorded 
conversations in Hebrew at and around several family dinners of  one family.18 It was the first 
conversation I transcribed, because it appears close to the start of  one of  the recording sessions. 
No other criteria were applied in selecting it. 
1 R: tagid lahem lavo ke ha’okhel itkarer kar hayom. 
     Tell them to come cuz the food is getting cold it's cold today. 
2    (17.2) ((R sets the table)) 
3 S: anakhnu nukhal laazor bemashehu? 
     Can we help with anything? 
4 R: lo aval tzarikh lashevet ki ha’okhel itkarer kar hayom. 
     No but you should sit down cause the food is getting cold it's cold today. 
5 S: ↓oy [(h)(h)(h) [im lo nokhal lo nigdal? 
      Oy! If we don't eat we won't grow? 
6 R:     [ma she-   [ma shetov she- 
          The        The good thing is that 
7     (0.5) 
8 R: bidyuk. (.) ma shetov she’ani yoshevet levad. (h)(h)(h) 
      Exactly. The good thing is that I'm sitting alone. 
The first step in analyzing this conversation is to break it down into utterances. As already 
noted, an utterance in a conversation is the same thing as a turn of  talk. Most turns of  talk 
occupy exactly one line in the transcript. Exceptions are the silence in line 2, which is not an 
utterance, but rather the lack of  one, and lines 6–8, which I will treat as a single utterance by R. 
                                                 
18 The family is my own, and I am one of  the two interlocutors (S). This may be said to introduce subjective bias. 
Had my purpose been sociological in nature (e.g. looking at power relations between the speakers) that would have 
been a problem. But what I am looking at here are basic properties of  spontaneous spoken discourse, and whatever 
bias I may have cannot be assisted by me being one of  the speakers (to be sure, the recording was made long before 
the model I am testing was developed). On the other hand, being a participant in the interaction gives me access to 
useful information about the setting and the people involved. 
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Line 1 
Stage 1: the setting 
This brief  conversation took place between R and S, both adult native speakers of  Hebrew. R 
has invited her two adult children and her son-in-law, S, to lunch with her on Saturday. This is a 
family tradition: such gatherings have been held almost every weekend for many years. 
The transcript begins when R has already finished cooking the meal and is busy putting the 
dishes on the dinner table. S is reading in the living room (so is in R’s sight but not very close to 
her). R’s two children are in another room. 
R has an expectable move to make in the setting, to call her guests. Will this expectation be 
confirmed? 
Stage 2: elements and their meaning potentials 
To see that, let us examine the elements and in particular the CFs that we can find in the 
utterance. 
I analyze the beginning of  this utterance, tagid lahem lavo, as a compound of  the CFs: tagid 
lahem la/le… [“tell them to…”]; efshar lavo [“(you) may come”]; bo’u le’ekhol [“dinner is served” 
(literally: “come to eat”)] (as any CF analysis, it admits of  some variation). 
The first CF has the potential to be identified with a situation that arises in hierarchical social 
institutions: when a superior delivers instructions though a subordinate serving as proxy (an 
executive and secretary would come to mind). Note that this is not the only use to which this CF 
can be put, but it is a typical picture that comes to mind in association with it. 
The second CF also has a typical situation linked with it, one that is also linked to the setting 
(which is why I claim this CF is present here, with the unpronounced word efshar). This situation 
involves visitors who were earlier asked to wait before coming in (the house / office / room), 
and are now told their waiting is over. 
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Finally, the third CF is linked to a typical action, namely calling people (specifically, members 
of  one’s own family) to the dinner table. 
Put together, the three CFs in the given setting function as the expected call for people to 
come to the dinner table. The authoritative potential in the first CF is not fully actualized, as 
there are no formal hierarchical relationships between R and S, but R does seem to be giving S 
an instruction, which implies authority (here presumably stemming from her role as the host). 
Next comes ki [here slightly mispronounced as ke; “cause”]. Connectors usually serve as short 
CFs. This is the case here. This CF introduces an explanation or account of  some sort. 
The CF ha’okhel itkarer [“the food is getting cold” (literally: “the food will cool down”)]. 
carries not only a distinct situation and action, but also a distinct persona. The situation is one in 
which warm food has been served on the table, but the child who is supposed to be eating it is 
not there. The action is that of  a parent urging the child to come. More specifically, the speaking 
parent is identified with a specific social stereotype, the Jewish Mother, on which I will elaborate 
below. 
The CF kar hayom [“it’s cold today” (literally: “cold today”)] belongs generally to the genre of  
talks about the weather, but in this context may also be interpreted as alluding to such phrases 
(also CFs) as: Tilbash mashehu. Kar hayom [put something on; it’s a cold day today], also identified 
with the Jewish Mother persona. 
Stage 3: voices 
Next, let us look at the orchestration of  voices in this utterance. The first compound (tagid lahem 
lavo) is in the author’s voice, and is clearly linked to the setting. R here instructs or asks S to call 
everyone else to the table. But then R announces an explanation of  some sort is coming (ki), 
which appears redundant.  
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The rest of  the utterance is made in the voice of  a persona – the Jewish Mother. The Jewish 
Mother19 is a stereotypical character that is often the focus of  amused remarks among the family 
members gathered in R’s flat. She is always anxious that her children eat up, wear warm clothes, 
feel guilty about how they treat their poor mother, leaving her to suffer alone after all she has 
done for them, and of  course eat their food while it is warm. This persona is also linked to R’s 
role as the mother of  the family, and even to her ethnic identity. Both these figures (Cooren 2010) 
are thus also involved in the utterance through the Jewish Mother persona. 
The Jewish Mother provides the announced explanation for the call to dinner: she urges her 
children to come right away, while the food is still warm. This in turn is explained by citing the 
cold whether. 
The Jewish Mother’s voice is clearly a deliberate exaggeration but it is not an outright parody: 
it joins R’s purpose of  calling the guests to the table. In Bakhtin’s terminology, we have here a 
case of  unidirectional double-voiced discourse (Bakhtin 1984, 189ff). 
Stages 4&5: designated meaning and action in the setting 
Based on all this we may reconstruct what may have been the anticipated response of  the implied 
audience (identified with S) to this utterance. R seems to have a double aim: to have S call the 
others to the table and add the Jewish Mother into the conversation as a topic, for amusement’s 
sake. But S never replied. Instead, S addressed R later, in line 3. 
Line 3 
Stage 2: elements and their meaning potentials 
This utterance contains just one compound, which I analyze as containing the CFs: efshar la’azor 
bemashehu? [“may I help with anything?” (literally: “is it possible to help in anything?”)], ani ukhal 
                                                 
19 Most Hebrew speakers would identify this persona as the Polish mother, referring to Jews of  Polish descent (a 
group to which R belongs). The comical version of  the Jewish mother stereotype is a close equivalent, which is 
current in English-speaking communities. 
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le...? [“can I…?” / “may I…?” / “would it be possible for me to…?”], and anakhnu nuchal [“we’ll 
be able to” / “we’ll have the opportunity to”]. 
The first CF is the nucleus of  the compound (which also gives it its final rising intonation). It 
is a standard formula for offering help. 
The second and third of  the CFs are really only used to make it possible for S, through 
analogy with them (Gasparov 2010, 113–148) to make the offer of  help not only in his own 
name, but in the name of  a group of  people.20 The CF ani uchal le/la…? has a frequent analogue 
in the synonymous CF efshar le/la…? and the grammatical shift from first person singular to first 
person plural is also a product of  derivation by analogy through a variety of  CF’s that have both 
a first person singular and a first person plural version and are differentiated in a similar manner 
(“ani X” vs. “anakhnu nX”). 
Stages 3–5: voices, designated meaning, and action in the setting 
The whole compound is thus an almost conventional offer of  help, placed in a setting in which 
such an offer would be an expectable (if  belated) act of  courtesy. It is more or less single-voiced 
and the audience voice, as an offer naturally implies, is asked to accept or reject. 
Line 4 
Stage 2: elements and their meaning potentials 
The CFs I find in line 4 are: lo, aval… [“no, but…”]. This is a conventional means for doing 
rejection of  one of  several kinds (in our case, given the setting, that would be the action of  
rejecting an offer), and then buying some time for a rejoinder. 
tsarikh la/le… [“(you) should…” (literally: “it is needed to…”)]; shvu le’ekhol [“let’s start the 
meal” (literally: “sit down to eat”)]. The first CF is the Hebrew “tsarikh+infinitive” construction. 
Its most generic use is to urge the interlocutor to do something or note that something has to be 
                                                 
20 The group is most likely S himself  and his spouse; unfortunately, the context that would elucidate why S does 
so is lost. 
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done in a particular situation. The setting indeed indicates an action (getting everyone to the 
dinner table) is being urged. This action is also alluded to by the other CF, closely related to the 
CF bo’u le’ekhol from line 1. The CF shvu le’ekhol is also used to call people, usually one’s children, 
to start a meal that was served. The grammatical shift of  shvu (second person plural imperative) 
into lashevet (infinitive) is again to be interpreted as a derivation by analogy. 
ki; ha’okhel itkarer; kar hayom. All these CFs are already familiar from line 1. This fact adds 
another appropriating dialogic relation to note here, between these CFs and their counterparts in 
line 1. 
Stages 3&4: voices and designated meaning 
The first CF is in the author’s voice (as an expectable move in the setting). Apart from that, there 
is nothing to add to the analysis of  line 1. S, the implied audience, is urged to call the other 
guests to the table, while noting the humorous appearance of  the Jewish Mother. 
Stage 5: response to previous utterances 
On the level of  immediate dialogic relations, the utterance in line 4 responds to both utterances 
analyzed above, as well as to the silence in line 2, and reflects (on) their meanings. Line 4 repeats 
the utterance in line 1. This indicates R’s understanding that what she said in line 1 did not reach 
its addressee and her assumption that in line 2 we do not have deliberate lack of  response on S’s 
part. This also indicates the two utterances in lines 1 and 4 are similar in function. Finally, the 
precision with which most of  line 1 is repeated in line 4 (including fine prosodic detail) indicates 
that the formulation she uses is preplanned. 
The CF lo, aval… issues the expectable (Davidson 1984) rejection of  the offer in line 3. It 
reflects on line 3 as an action to which the preferred response is negative. But note also that, as R 
has another request of  S, she seems to reflect a restricted understanding of  what S offers to help 
with: probably only putting food on the table, but clearly not calling the others in. 
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Line 5 
Stage 2: elements and their meaning potentials 
The CF oy! is a conventional exclamation of  grief, originating in Yiddish, and pronounced here 
with a somewhat exaggerated intonation. It is followed by a laughter token. Next comes the CF im 
lo tokhal lo tigdal [“If  you don’t eat you won’t grow”]. This CF is strongly identified with the 
Jewish Mother persona (here it is again modified by analogy to the first person plural). The 
utterance ends with a rising final intonation contour that is not contributed by any of  the CFs and 
stands on its own as an element. This element is most typically identified with the action of  
asking a question or of  making a guess. 
Stages 3&4: voices and designated meaning 
On the level of  reenacted dialogic relations, this utterance has a rather complicated structure. 
The coupling of  the exclamation oy! with laughter, as well as the exaggerated intonation, indicates 
irony, which is, again, a form of  vari-directional double-voiced discourse in Bakhtin’s terms. 
But in whose voice is this ironic expression of  grief  made? If  the fact that “Oy!” has what is 
taken to be a distinct Yiddish sound to it is not enough, the CF im lo tokhal lo tigdal, belonging to 
the repertoire of  the Jewish Mother, makes it clear that the Jewish Mother persona is indeed the 
one being parodied here. But note that the transformation of  this latter CF into the first person 
plural form adds an extra layer to the orchestration of  voices: the double-voiced constructions in 
both CFs have an overlay not of  the author’s voice over that of  the Jewish Mother, but rather of  
the voice of  another persona. Here it is that of  the Jewish Mother’s child, whose role in the 
conventional drama played out here is to rebel against his mother and ridicule her. 
The voices of  the author and the audience in this utterance are heard in the intonation. The 
laughter token is in the author’s voice, as its intonation carries none of  the defiance that the 
Child persona would be expressing. By laughing in this way S frames the Child’s defiance and 
ridicule as being done in jest, or, in other words, we have here two layers of  double-voicedness – 
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the Child’s voice overlays the Jewish Mother’s in a vari-directional double-voiced construction, 
and is itself  overlaid by the author’s voice. 
The rising final intonation introduces the implied audience’s voice. It is a conventional device 
for doing so. The author appeals to the audience, as it were, to confirm, deny, accept, reject, or 
provide some information sought for, by adding an audience-voice overlay to the end of  his or 
her utterance. In the case of  the utterance in line 5, there is no question being asked, and 
whatever there is to be inquired about appears in the voice of  the Child, not the author. We 
should therefore interpret the rising final intonation as making the whole utterance a sort of  
guess; the audience voice is heard to confirm the author’s position (that is, a confirmation is an 
expectable or preferred response projected by the utterance). What this position is becomes clear 
when we consider the immediate dialogic relations in which this utterance is involved. 
Stage 5: response to previous utterances and action in the setting 
Now, recall R’s preceding move: R wanted S to call the other guests to the dinner table, but also 
brought in the Jewish Mother theme. What S does in response is to strongly reflect the Jewish 
Mother theme, without yet calling the other guests to the table. This way S reflects the meaning 
of  R’s utterance in line 4 as being primarily about the Jewish Mother (which is not necessarily how 
R would have construed it). This move is a bit risky on S’s part also because the Jewish Mother 
voice in R’s utterance might have been, in principle, interpreted as a spontaneous expression of  
her author’s voice, in which case S’s response could potentially be offensive to R. So what the 
guessing intonation at the end of  line 5 does is to ask R for a confirmation that the Jewish 
Mother voice was used on purpose. 
Lines 6–8 
In line 6 R tries twice to start talking in parallel with S’s line 5. She does so at two possible 
completion points of  S’s turn (Sacks, Schegloff  and Jefferson 1974). A comparison with line 8 
makes it clear that what she was trying to say in line 6 she eventually said in line 8. The delay (line 
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7) is because R had to add a new beginning to what she planned to say. The analysis below will 
thus focus on line 8 itself. 
Stage 2: elements and their meaning potentials 
Here are the elements I identify in this utterance: 
bidyuk. [“exactly.”]. This CF’s primary use is to confirm guesses. 
ma shetov she… [“the good thing is that…”; literally: “what’s good is that”]. This CF is used to 
introduce a positive (from the speaker’s perspective) aspect of  an otherwise difficult situation or 
topic. 
ani yoshevet levad [“I’m sitting on my own”]; yoshevet levad, bakhoshekh [“sitting alone, in the 
dark”]; yoshevet le’ekhol [“(I am / she is) sitting at the dinner table”; literally: “sitting to eat”]. While 
ani yoshevet levad can be said to be a CF in its own right (indicating the speaker’s loneliness at a 
time or situation in which she would be expected to be in the company of  others; here the 
posture of  sitting down is also part of  the meaning potential of  the CF, but it mainly implies 
social activities in which people engage while seated), other similar CFs also come to mind and 
seem to be linked with aspects of  the setting. 
One of  these – yoshevet le’echol – is linked to the setting in the same way as lashevet le’echol and 
bo’u le’echol were in lines 4 and 1. The CF yoshevet levad, bakhoshekh again belongs to the Jewish 
Mother, and is perhaps the expression most identified with this persona in the wider public. 
Stage 3: voices 
The initial CF is an expectable move in the setting and is uttered in the author’s voice. The CF 
ma shetov she is ironic, because what it introduces is a CF with clearly negative, not positive, 
connotations. But whose voices are heard in the ironic construction? We see the Jewish Mother 
again at the end (yoshevet levad, bakhoshekh), and indeed, bitter irony is typical of  this persona (as a 
means of  inducing guilty feelings in her children). So we may interpret the CF in the middle as 
vari-directional double-voiced discourse with the voice of  the Child overlaid by that of  the 
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Jewish Mother, who then goes on to induce guilt in the Child by saying, in her own voice, that 
she will be sitting alone. 
But this drama happens not between the author and audience voices of  the utterance, but 
between the two personae. R’s author voice overlays the Jewish Mother’s voice in a way that will 
become clear if  we recall the setting. R still wants S to call everybody to the table, and she is 
again using the Jewish Mother persona as a means of  getting S to do this. But R also plays the 
social role of  host. The utterance thus implies a picture in which the figure of  the host is sitting 
alone and eating the meal (so here yoshevet le’ekhol is heard in the compound ani yoshevet levad, 
instead of  yoshevet levad, bakhoshekh), while her guests are not. This is meant to be heard by the 
audience as an absurd situation to be avoided. 
The Jewish Mother’s voice is thus overlaid by the author’s voice in a unidirectional double-
voiced construction again, but the meaning potential of  the last compound CF is exploited in 
different ways by the two voices. The audience, as in lines 1 and 4, is still urged to call the other 
guests to the table, as the Jewish Mother theme unfolds.  
Stages 4&5: designated meaning and response to previous utterances 
So, in response to S’s utterance in line 5, R first confirms the guess (bidyuk), and thus reflects the 
utterance in line 5 as a guess. The guess itself  was about the Jewish Mother theme appearing in 
R’s utterance in line 4 on purpose. R reflects this point by using another stereotypical Jewish 
Mother CF. But by reiterating her request to call the other guests R also enters a negotiation with 
S of  the way her previous utterance (line 4) was reflected in his response in line 5. S reflected the 
Jewish Mother theme while neglecting the practical request and R now repeats it to stress it 
again, while at the same time keeping the Jewish Mother theme at work. 
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Stage 6: actualization of  meaning in response 
Finally, there is the response to R’s utterance. S goes to the other room, and soon everybody 
come in and the meal begins. By doing this S reflects R’s utterance as a request to do so, and also, 
eventually, acts on his own offer of  help in line 3. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I tried to explore some of  the repercussions of  taking dialogicity to be the truly 
fundamental feature of  language. I looked at what would happen if  we allow our understanding 
of  language as dialogue to guide our conceptualization of  linguistic meaning, the means by 
which an analysis of  what utterances mean would proceed, and the units that such an analysis 
would use. 
The semantic analysis I conducted in the latter half  of  the paper indicates that such a feat can 
be accomplished. The meaning of  the utterances in the analyzed conversation was reconstructed 
in a way that would make much sense to a listener familiar with the language and with relevant 
social practices and stereotypes.21 Moreover, the analysis was comprehensive in the sense that no 
part of  the content of  these utterances was left out of  it. On the other hand, I did not rely on 
the traditional concepts of  reference and truth (and the units of  word and sentence) in making 
it. All this is done in a consistent dialogic philosophical framework. 
The sort of  semantic analysis I conducted here is not meant to yield an exclusive account of  
what the analyzed utterances mean. There are many ways to understand any utterance, especially 
                                                 
21 Incidentally, this conversation poses practically insurmountable difficulties before a logical-referential analysis. 
For example, on the syntactic level, lines 1 and 4 can be divided into sentences in many ways, some quite wild, and 
they do not contain any prosodic clues that would help punctuate them correctly. Line 5 contains a modified idiom, 
and the traditional paradigm offers no means of  even identifying it as such. The approval voiced by R in line 8 
(“Exactly”) relates neither to anything encoded in the words and sentences voiced previously by S, nor to any 
implicature that can be shown to have been derived from them. 
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if  we pay attention to fine detail. In an actual interaction, people negotiate these understandings 
and reach common ground. But if  we wish to validate an understanding, the sort of  analysis I 
have demonstrated here would be a way to do it. 
To be sure, the analysis I conducted here will be considered by many to be irrelevant to 
semantics as such. After all, I did not have anything interesting to say about the semantic content 
of  the sentences (if  indeed these were sentences) that I analyzed. What I looked at was “merely” 
their use, ridden with performance errors. Indeed. But such an objection is paradigm-specific. 
The test of  an approach to language and meaning that does not stay within the traditional 
paradigm is not in accounting for “semantic content”, which is a notion normally defined in 
logical-referential terms, but in accounting as much as possible for the raw data of  language. In 
this case, the raw data would be what was actually said and done in the analyzed conversation (as 
much of  it as can be retrieved from the sound recording), and accounting for it means getting 
from these raw data to what people would agree is a plausible understanding of  what was said. 
But precisely because accounting for the raw data is the test of  the proposed approach, what 
I did in this paper can only be considered a first step. My aim here was to establish the possibility 
of  dialogic semantics, to demonstrate its basic ability to cope with a random bit of  natural 
language data. For the method of  semantic analysis I demonstrated here to be fully established, 
one has to test it on a reasonably large sample of  texts from a variety of  genres of  spoken and 
written communication. This undertaking goes well beyond the limits of  a single article. 
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